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THE GOOD CAUSE ACCOUNT OF
THE MEANING OF LIFE
Aaron Smuts
ABSTRACT: I defend the theory that one’s life is meaningful to the extent that one
promotes the good. Call this the good cause account (GCA) of the meaning of life. It
holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one’s life need not be
intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same
good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally
responsible for the good. I argue that the best theory of the meaning of life should
clearly distinguish between subjective fulfillment and objective meaningfulness. The
GCA respects the distinction. And it is superior to its leading rivals in the recent
literature, most notably those of Erik Wielenberg and Susan Wolf.
1. INTRODUCTION
Few would deny that Gandhi’s life is more meaningful than one spent making
handwritten copies of War and Peace, collecting rubber bands, counting the
blades of grass on Harvard Yard, or consuming large quantities of excrement.
This is a core datum that any theory of the meaning of life must respect on
pain of radical revisionism. I offer a normative theory of the meaning of life,
an axiological theory for evaluating lives. I call it the good cause account
(GCA) of the meaning of life. The general theory is straightforward: one’s
life is meaningful to the extent that it promotes the good.1 With suitable
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1 We will likely want to distinguish between far distant transient causes and genuine,
relevant causes. I am reluctant to say that the copulation responsible for my birth was a cause
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clarification, I think that this is the correct view of the meaning of life. I intend
to defend such a view here.
The good cause account is an objectivist theory of the meaning of life. It
identifies the meaningfulness of one’s life in the objective good that one
causes. This view is distinct from subjectivist accounts of the meaning of life.
Subjectivist theories hold that fulfillment or some other subjective state is
what makes a life meaningful. On such views, one’s life is meaningful if one
finds it meaningful or, we might say, fulfilling. I argue that we should reject
this style of theory. Further, I argue that we should reject any view of the
meaning of life that includes a necessary subjective condition. The GCA
holds that meaningfulness is not constituted by the reactions of the one living
the life.
My argument proceeds in a few steps. The bulk of the effort is devoted to
defending the general contours of the good cause account. I begin by sorting
out some of the conceptual terrain. First, I draw a distinction between welfare
and the meaning of life. Then I develop a defense of the good cause account
of the meaning of life in response to the problems facing a few other theories.2
I argue against both subjectivist theories and hybrid theories—those that
include both objective and subjective conditions. I show the relative virtues of
the good cause account over two of the most compelling theories in the
current literature, those offered by Erik Wielenberg and Susan Wolf.3 Finally,
after defending the major commitments of objectivist theories of the meaning
of life, I respond to several novel objections to objectivist theories of meaning.
Most important, I offer reasons to reject a problematic refinement. In the
process, I suggest a few options for a more precise formulation of the good
cause account.
2. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE MEANING OF LIFE
I am approaching the subject of the meaning of life as a mode of evaluating
lives. Hence, I am not trying to offer a descriptive theory of a psychological
state, such as fulfillment.4 I am interested in the evaluative concept of mean-
ingfulness. This is a kind of value that is conceptually distinct from several
of my stubbing my toe this morning. The copulation does not seem relevant. The CGA will
likely require a far more restricted notion of “cause,” than one that would count my birth.
However, it is far out of scope to develop a theory of causation here.
2 Given limitations of scope, my discussion cannot be comprehensive. This is not a survey
article. For an overview of the literature, see Metz (2002, 2005, and 2007).
3 Wolf (1997 and 2010) and Wielenberg (2005).
4 This is not to say that the evaluative notion will not make reference to psychological states.
Haybron (2010) makes a similar distinction in regard to happiness. The evaluative notion tracks
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other ways in which a life might be good.5 When assessing the meaning of a
life, we attribute to the life a degree of a certain kind of value—that of
meaningfulness. Lives that are below a threshold of this kind of value are
meaningless, or worse, they might have anti-meaning or negative meaning.6
Many people want their lives to be meaningful, to have positive meaning.
Viktor Frankl goes so far as to claim that the desire for meaning is the primary
motivational force in humans.7 He calls the drive “the will to meaning.”
Although Frankl may go too far, there is no denying that many people are
concerned with the meaningfulness of their lives. Meaningfulness is the kind
of value that comes into view upon deathbed reflection, where we wonder
about the significance of our lives.8 Think of Ivan Ilych’s deathbed turmoil.
Of course, meaning is not the only thing one might worry about. Deathbed
concerns are not confined to thoughts about meaning, as one might also
regret not having had enough fun. Nevertheless, the cliché gets something
right: we do not merely want to live happy lives, but meaningful lives as well.9
Hence, the kind of value we are concerned with appears to be distinct from
that of prudential value.10 The two concerns can come apart. We can readily
picture lives that are low in prudential value but high in meaningfulness.11
Simply imagine a happy life devoted to trivial amusements. Such a life is
plausibly good for the one who lives it, but not very meaningful. The inverse
is scarcely implausible. Of course, this is controversial. It depends on whether
or not meaning can directly affect how good a life is for the one who lives it.
Since the theory of the meaning of life that I defend does not rely on the claim
what is better called well-being. The descriptive concept is that of a psychological state—
happiness. I will return to this distinction later.
5 Feldman (2006, 8–12) lists 5 ways in which lives can be good: morally, causally, aestheti-
cally, exemplarily, and prudentially. Sumner (1996, 20–25) distinguishes between four kinds of
value: aesthetic, perfectionist, ethical, and prudential.
6 It is not clear what label we should give to the opposite of meaningfulness. I will typically
call it negative meaning. Alternatively, we might call it “anti-meaning” or “antimatter,” as Metz
(2005, 806) suggests. Unless otherwise noted, when I say “meaning” I mean positive meaning.
7 Frankl (1959, 99).
8 It is fairly common to motivate the concern this way. See Frankl (1959, 117), Metz (2001,
147), Wolf (2010, 8), and Wielenberg (2005). In contrast, Sumner (1996, 22 and 24) uses a
deathbed test to raise thoughts about welfare. The deathbed test suffers from similar problems
as the crib test for isolating concerns about welfare: imagine looking into your child’s crib. What
you want for it is what is in the child’s good. The problem for the test is that a parent might have
desires for their child’s future that are not based on the child’s welfare. For instance, a religious
fanatic may want it to become a suicide bomber. See Feldman (2006, 9–10) and Bradley (2009,
2–3) for a discussion of the crib test. Adams (1999, 97) proposes a similar test.
9 This is Wolf’s (2010b) central thesis.
10 Wolf (1997, 2010a, and 2010b) builds her theory around the difference between
well-being and meaning. As does Audi (2005, 342–3).
11 Due to limitations of scope, I’m eliding many subtleties. Here, I assume our everyday
notion of happiness, not some alien theory of eudemonia. No matter, I don’t mean to assume
or deny that self-interest is merely a matter of subjective happiness.
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that meaning does not directly affect welfare, I will not provide much defense
here. But it will help to explain the proposed distinction between welfare and
meaning in a bit more detail.
Theories of prudential value (also known as “well-being,” “welfare,” and
“self-interest”) tell us what makes a life good for the one who lives it. Well-
being is conceptually distinct from many other ways in which a life may be
good. For instance, a life of self-sacrifice spent working for the poor might be
both morally and instrumentally good, in that it benefits the needy, but it is
not necessarily good for the one who lives it. We do not intend to benefit
ourselves through self-sacrifice. This is precisely what makes it self-sacrifice.
Although it is almost always morally good to sacrifice one’s own good for the
good of others, it is almost never, or at least not necessarily, intrinsically
prudentially good.12
A leading theory of welfare called “mental statism” holds that the sole
bearers of intrinsic prudential value are mental states.13 Hedonism, for
instance, is a specific type of mental statism that counts only the mental states
of pleasure and pain.14 Most controversially, mental statism implies what is
known as the experience requirement—the claim that what you do not
experience cannot hurt you.15 There is a fairly wide consensus, although not
without dissenting opinion, that experience machine-style examples show
that mental statism is false.16
The most compelling counter-example to mental statism is Nozick’s expe-
rience machine.17 Nozick asks us to imagine a machine that would be able to
simulate a wide array of fantastic experiences. The experiment gives us, what
is by now, a familiar sales pitch: perhaps you want to write the great Ameri-
can novel. In the experience machine you can have the experience of writing
the most celebrated novel in history. Your work will be praised far and wide.
12 Desire satisfaction theories of well-being seem to imply that self-sacrifice is impossible. See
Overvold (1980) for a forceful presentation of the issue. Heathwood (2011) defends a solution.
13 Kagan (1994 and 1992) confesses his temptation toward mental statism. He argues for the
claim that to have an effect on a person’s well-being, something must have an effect on the
intrinsic properties of the person. He later (2009, 771, n.3) recants.
14 Parfit (1984) and Wolf (1997) reverse this distinction. They seem to hold that all forms of
mental statism are forms of hedonism.
15 Griffin (1986, 13). Since the experience requirement is not always presented in the same
way, I have chosen to focus on mental statism. Soll (1998), for instance, defends a theory called
experientialism that has both motivational and broad axiological implications. Mental statism,
as I have formulated it, implies only a limited axiological claim about well-being: something can
affect someone’s well-being only if it makes an experiential difference for that person.
16 Nozick’s (1974, 42–5) “Experience Machine,” Nagel’s (1993, 64) “Deceived Business-
man,” Nagel’s (1993, 66) “Contented Infant,” Mill’s (2002) “Pig,” and Nozick’s (1997) “Mon-
golian Pornographer” are the most pressing thought experiments in opposition to mental
statism.
17 Nozick (1974, 42–5).
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Champion athlete, war hero, legendary lover, you name it—in the machine,
you will experience any life that you desire. Most important, life in the
machine will seem as real as any experience that you have ever had. You will
never know the difference.
Nozick asks us whether given the chance we would step into the
machine. Except for a couple of undergraduates, all the people I’ve asked
say that they would decline. Most of them opt out of the machine because
they do not merely want to think that they have written the great American
novel; they want to write it. They do not merely want to think that they
have genuine relationships; they want to form genuine bonds with others.
They like to win, but they do not want every game to be fixed in their
favor.
Perhaps the frivolous and the terminally ill might plug in, but most of the
people that I’ve talked to opt out of a life in the experience machine. I see no
reason to think this reaction is aberrant. And I see no reason to think that
their repulsion to life in the machine is mistaken. Nevertheless, Nozick’s
scenario does not constitute a decisive objection to mental statism. Yes, the
thought experiment clearly shows that we want more than mere experiences,
but it does not show that things without experiential impact can affect our
well-being. The thought experiment merely confirms what we already knew:
we desire many things other than our own well-being.18 Strict psychological
egoism is highly implausible. We often non-selfishly desire the good of others.
People frequently sacrifice themselves for a cause or for the benefit of those
they love. And many people have been known to sacrifice their own well-
being for other kinds of goods, such as truth, contact with reality, moral
worth, and meaningfulness.
Sometimes we rationally hold the meaning of our life in greater esteem
than our own good. Achilles’ choice illustrates the point. Achilles knew that if
he entered the battle against the Trojans, he would die soon, but that his
name would live on for ages; however, if he stayed out of the fight, his name
would be forgotten, but his life would be long and happy. He chose a short
meaningful life over a long life high in individual welfare. He was not merely
motivated by a desire for fame, but for achievement and, more significantly,
revenge for Hector’s slaying of Patroclus.19 Regardless of whether we think
18 In defense of mental statism, Haslett (1990) appeals to this distinction, as do Goldsworthy
(1992), Bradley (2009, 10), Kawall (1999), and Feldman (2012, 67–72). For additional discussion
of this line of argument, see Tännsjö (1998, 111–12) and Sumner (1996, 96–7).
19 It is not clear whether a desire for posthumous fame is self-interested. When it is, we are
likely confused.
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that glory on the battlefield is a “project of worth,” given his values, Achilles’
decision was eminently rational.20 It is perfectly rational to care about our
lives and not just our welfare.21
Most seem to think that a life in the experience machine would be mean-
ingless. Insofar as we desire meaningfulness, we will opt out of the machine.22
This does not show that we think that we would be better off—that we would
have a higher state of welfare—outside of the machine. Life in the machine
simply cannot give us everything that we want. Since we want more than
what merely increases our well-being, the case against mental statism is
inconclusive.
I do not pretend that this brief consideration of the experience machine
objection is a decisive reply. Regardless of whether the experience machine
objection refutes mental statism about welfare, it has important implications
for theories of the meaning of life. Although some think that you could live a
life high in prudential value inside the experience machine, few think that you
could live a meaningful life inside the machine.23 At least this much is clear.
The difference in intuitions shows that there is a conceptual difference
between meaning and well-being. If they were conceptually identical, it is
hard to see how we could be less certain about how meaningful a life could be
in the experience machine than about how high in welfare such a life could
be. But many people are indeed far less certain about one than the other.
Perhaps the set of lives high in meaning will be identical to the set of lives high
in welfare. I doubt it, but either way, there is a conceptual difference. The two
concepts are not the same.
I turn now to show how the experience machine helps eliminate an entire
category of theories of the meaning of life—subjectivist theories.
3. SUBJECTIVIST THEORIES
Subjectivist theories of the meaning of life hold that what makes a life
meaningful is purely a matter of how that life seems to the one who lives it.
These theories are mental statist theories of the meaning of life. Richard
20 Wolf (1997, 2010a, and 2010b) argues that meaning in a life is a result of active engage-
ment in projects of worth.
21 Kagan (1992 and 1994) makes a distinction between me and my life. I think that this is
best expressed in terms of different kinds of value. Our lives can have value for us, and they can
also have instrumental, aesthetic, and moral value. Unfortunately Kagan’s distinction is rarely,
if ever, noted in the meaning of life literature. For instance, Metz does not cite either paper in
his numerous surveys.
22 Other desires will suffice, such as the desire for contact with reality. A desire for meaning
is not the only thing that can motivate repulsion at the experience machine.
23 For instance, Metz (2002, 803; 2005, 313; and 2007, 208) agrees.
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Taylor provides a classic defense of such a view.24 He develops a theory of the
meaning of life through an additive procedure: first identify a clearly mean-
ingless life. Then try adding to it. When you add something that makes
the life meaningful, you will have found the sufficient conditions for
meaningfulness.25
Taylor’s first step is to identify a clearly meaningless life. He picks Sisyphus,
who is condemned to eternal, meaningless toil—each day he must roll a
boulder up a hill only to have it roll back down when he approaches the top.
Clearly, in the myth of Sisyphus we find a meaningless life. He is grudgingly
engaged in a pointless task. His life is meaningless. In search of sufficient
conditions for meaningfulness, Taylor suggests two general strategies for
remedying the deficiency. We could either (1) give Sisyphus’s activity a
valuable result, have it result in an enduring accomplishment, or (2) we could
change his attitude toward his task. Taylor rejects the first and defends the
second approach.
The first strategy might appear to be promising. It seems that Sisyphus’s
life is meaningless because his activity leads to nothing. Rolling a stone up a
hill endlessly is a pointless task. Sisyphus is no better than a hamster running
in a wheel. Accordingly, one might think that the meaninglessness of his life
is solely a result of the meaninglessness of his project. If only the stone rolling
had a purpose. Taylor asks us to imagine a revised version of the myth where
Sisyphus is able to round the peak of the hill and assemble his daily rocks into
a glorious cathedral. His stone rolling would now have a point. It would
produce something of enduring value. Surely this would make his life mean-
ingful. He would have left his mark on the world.
The problem, Taylor argues, is that this option is not available to us. Our
accomplishments simply do not endure:
Our achievements, even though they are often beautiful, are mostly bubbles; and
those that do last, like the sand swept pyramids, soon become mere curiosities while
around the rest of mankind continues its perpetual toting of rocks, only to see them
roll down.26
To see why, we need not appeal to a grand cosmic time frame of a few
billion years. Sure, in a few billion years all human accomplishments will be
obliterated when the sun burns out and sucks our solar system into a black
hole. But we do not need to wait so long. How many human accomplish-
ments last more than a few generations? How many fewer last for a few
24 Taylor (2008). He later rejected purely subjective theories.
25 Wolf (2010a, 796) adopts the same strategy.
26 Taylor (2008, 139).
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thousand years? Not even one in ten thousand. Hence, we should give up on
the futile attempt to make our lives meaningful through enduring accom-
plishments. Taylor suggests another option. He asks us to imagine yet
another version of the Sisyphus myth: in this version the gods give Sisyphus
the desire to do nothing but roll stones. Now we find Sisyphus fulfilled. He
has all the time in the world to do nothing but what he most wants to do.
What joy! The gods, Taylor argues, have given Sisyphus an incredible gift—
they made his life meaningful.
Taylor claims to have identified a sufficient condition for meaningfulness,
a condition that is happily within our reach. It’s fulfillment.27 He offers a
purely subjectivist theory. Whether one’s life is meaningful is entirely a matter
of how meaningful one finds it. There is no objective fact of the matter, apart
from how fulfilling we find our lives. There is an objective fact of the matter
of about one’s level of fulfillment. But the theory holds that the meaningful-
ness of a life is constitutively dependent on one’s response to that life. On this
theory no lives are objectively any more or less meaningful than others.28
They all lead to the same result: nothing. Meaning is subjective.29 Fulfillment
is all we need to lead a meaningful life.
I think we should be suspicious of every step of Taylor’s argument, but I
will hold off on the details. Rather than assessing the argument, we can see
that the theory is wrong because of its implications. Purely subjective theories
have absurd implications. We have already seen the first absurdity: subjec-
tivist theories of the meaning of life imply that one could live a meaningful life
in the experience machine. More specifically, they imply that a life devoted to
curing cancer in the machine could be more meaningful than a similar life
outside the machine. It would be more meaningful if the person in the
machine felt a higher degree of fulfillment. But this is absurd. It is pointless to
devote oneself to curing cancer inside the experience machine. There are no
cancer victims in the machine; there are only simulations. Sure, it might be
morally good to pursue the cure in the machine. And there might be some
achievement value to solving intellectual puzzles in the machine. But no good
would result from a machine cure.
Similarly, purely subjectivist theories cannot appropriately distinguish
between actual lives. Taylor’s theory implies that any two equally fulfilling
lives are equally meaningful, even if one is devoted to curing cancer and the
27 Wolf (2010b) calls Taylor’s theory the “fulfillment theory.”
28 This is why I call Taylor’s theory a subjectivist theory. This usage is fairly standard in
the literature. See Metz (2002, 792). Brogaard and Smith (2005, 444) carve up the terrain
differently, into internalist and externalist theories.
29 Huemer (2005, 2–3) develops this notion of “subjective.”
GOOD CAUSE ACCOUNT OF THE MEANING OF LIFE 543
other is devoted to consuming vast quantities of excrement.30 But a grinning
excrement eater does not live as meaningful of a life as a cancer researcher.
It is absurd to suggest otherwise. Hence, we should reject the subjective
theory. It is radically out of touch with our concept of meaningfulness.31
A fictional example will help secure the objection. Frank Capra’s It’s a
Wonderful Life (1946) gives us an excellent reason to reject the subjective
theory. The movie tells what is now a familiar story of a suicidal man, George
Bailey (James Stewart), who is finally able see the meaning of his life with a
little help from a friend—an alcoholic angel who wants to make good. The
angel takes George on a trip to Pottersville—the alternate world where
George had never been born. A few hours in Pottersville is enough for George
to see how meaningful his existence has been. The problem for the subjec-
tivist theory is this: the theory implies that no one can be wrong about how
meaningful or meaningless they find their life. If one finds it fulfilling, it is
meaningful. But George Bailey’s despair gives us excellent reason to reject
such a view. On his dark night of the soul, George mistakenly thought that his
life was meaningless because the family business was likely to fail under his
stewardship. The bank’s collapse would indeed be a tremendous failure, but
George was wrong to think that his life would be meaningless as a result. His
merely thinking it so does not make his life meaningless. The trip to
Pottersville helps George see his mistake. His despair was based on an incor-
rect assessment of the value of his life.
We can be right or wrong about these things. George was wrong and so,
conversely, is Sisyphus fulfilled. Sure, someone might feel fulfilled eating
buckets of excrement or endlessly rolling rocks up a hill, but that does not
mean that fulfillment is appropriate to either life. Fulfillment is not sufficient
for meaning.32
4. HYBRID THEORIES
Hybrid theories of the meaning of life try to capture the importance of both
feelings of fulfillment and its objective appropriateness. They have both
subjective and objective conditions. One of the most plausible hybrid theories
30 Wielenberg (2005, 22) names the example the “grinning excrement eater.” Cottingham
(2003, 23) asks us to imagine the life of a dedicated torturer working for an evil dictator.
31 See Metz (2002, 795) for further references into the large literature criticizing Taylor’s
subjectivist theory.
32 Hooker (2008, 192) argues that self-benefit can contribute to the meaning of life. Hence,
“there is a subjectivist sufficient condition for the agent’s life having at least some meaning.”
Hooker is operating with a different notion of “subjective.” Most plausibly, self-benefit is
objectively good on my notion of objectivity.
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is that developed by Susan Wolf. Wolf argues that one’s life is made mean-
ingful through active engagement in projects of worth.33 She calls her theory
the fitting fulfillment view. To put it in slogan form, the view holds that
meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness. The
slogan emphasizes two important conditions: (1) subjective attraction, and
(2) the objective value of the pursuit. The first condition captures what is
appealing about the purely subjective view. Fulfillment appears to be a
necessary condition on living a meaningful life. But unlike purely subjectivist
views, hybrid views do not hold that fulfillment is sufficient. Since this was the
chief source of trouble for Taylor’s subjectivist theory, the fitting fulfillment
view escapes the main problems facing its subjectivist rival. Wolf’s hybrid
view is neither vulnerable to experience machine style objections, nor to the
grinning excrement eater reductio ad absurdum. The fitting fulfillment view
correctly implies that the grinning excrement eater lives a meaningless life.
The project of devouring heaping piles of excrement is not a project of worth.
It is not a fitting object of fulfillment.
At this point, the defender of the subjective theory might object that the
fitting fulfillment view implies something equally counter-intuitive. Just as the
critics charged that the purely subjectivist view cannot distinguish between
more and less meaningful lives of equal levels of fulfillment, the fitting fulfill-
ment view also implies that the life of a cancer researcher is equally mean-
ingful as that of the grinning excrement eater. This is because neither is
engaged in a project of worth. No one can be. Curing cancer is no more
objectively valuable than eating excrement. One might press this charge
based on two types of considerations.34 First, one might argue that there is no
objective value. This is the position of the nihilist. I will put this line of
argument aside for now and consider it along with a few other objections.
Second, one might argue that curing cancer is no more objectively valu-
able than eating excrement, since the ultimate outcome of both is the same:
the ultimate outcome is a cold, lifeless entropic universe.35 Bertrand Russell
puts it succinctly:
all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday
brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar
33 Wolf (2010b, 9).
34 I want to put aside all issues concerning supernatural sources of meaning. It’s not clear
that supernatural meaning helps at all. Merely being part of God’s plan does little for us, unless
the plan is good. It appears that goodness is fundamental. For a survey of the literature on
supernatural meaning, see Metz (2002, 783–792).
35 Wielenberg (2005, 16) calls this the “final outcome argument.” I can only give it a cursory
hearing.
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system, and [. . .] the whole temple of man’s achievement must inevitably be buried
beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.36
The final outcome of all human actions is worthless. And nothing can be good
if its ultimate outcome is worthless. Hence, no human activities are any better
than any others. Accordingly, the fitting fulfillment view faces the same
problems as the purely subjective view.
Similar considerations lead Taylor to reject an objective component to the
meaning of life. Taylor gives us good reason to think that the meaning of life
cannot come from enduring accomplishments, since nothing we do will
endure for long at all. But this does not give us any reason to think that all
projects are of equal worth. Why would it? The argument against the fitting
fulfillment theory contains a wildly implausible premise. There is no reason to
think that the value of an activity is entirely determined by its ultimate
outcome. Certainly there is value in making someone laugh, even if they do
not laugh forever. Surely there is value in providing a hot meal for the
hungry, even if they are not satiated for all eternity. And surely it is good to
cure cancer, even if humanity does not endure until the end of time. These
claims are far more secure than any premise in the final outcome argument.37
Something need not be permanent in order to be valuable while it exists. As
Paul Edwards notes, to think otherwise is to exhibit an irrational, arbitrary
preference for the distant future.38
Although the fitting fulfillment view escapes the worry from final out-
comes, it is still not clear that we should accept the theory. Once again, It’s a
Wonderful Life helps us see a significant problem. This time the problem is for
hybrid theories. In his moment of despair, George Bailey thought his life’s
work had come to naught. He felt like an abject failure. But, as noted above,
he was wrong.39 The failure of the family bank would certainly be a significant
loss; however, it would not sap his life of positive meaning. Just look at how
much good George did for the people in his town. Although George could not
see it, his life was indeed meaningful. This is why the trip to Pottersville was
useful. It helps correct his incorrect assessment of the meaning of his life.
The problem for the hybrid theory is just this: if George had not been
shaken out of his mistaken evaluation, if his guardian angel had not given him
36 Russell (2008, 56).
37 Seachris (2011, 157) offers some support of the core considerations of the final outcome
argument.
38 Edwards (2008, 121). In addition, both Wielenberg (2005, 29) and Wolf (2010b) make this
point. Nagel (2008) seems to raise a similar objection. Wielenberg raises several problems for the
final outcome argument.
39 Similarly, Hooker (2008, 193–4) argues that deathbed re-evaluations show that we can be
wrong about the meaningfulness of our lives.
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a glimpse of Pottersville, George’s life would still have been meaningful. He
would not have realized it. In fact, he probably would have killed himself.
Indeed, he would have died without a sense of fulfillment. But this would not
make his life meaningless; it was high in meaning either way.40 George just
could not see it in his moment of despair. Since, in this unfortunate scenario,
George lived a meaningful life that was without feelings of fulfillment, the
fitting fulfillment theory is wrong. Similar considerations give us good reason
to reject any hybrid theory. No matter the subjective condition, we can
imagine a case where someone lacks the subjective condition but nevertheless
lives a meaningful life. Hence, there is no necessary subjective condition on
the meaning of life. We should reject both subjectivist and hybrid theories of
the meaning of life. Any viable theory will be a purely objectivist theory.
5. OBJECTIVIST THEORIES
In the previous two sections I argue against both subjectivist and hybrid
theories of the meaning of life. Subjectivist theories have the absurd implica-
tion that a life in the experience machine is more meaningful than any less
subjectively fulfilling life outside the machine. The most prominent hybrid
theories mistakenly assume that fulfillment is a necessary condition for living
a meaningful life. Such views have trouble accounting for the fact that one
can live a meaningful life, but mistakenly think otherwise. George Bailey lived
a meaningful life despite his discontent. I turn now to a defense of a purely
objectivist theory. I argue that objectivist theories avoid the problems of
subjectivist and hybrid views.
Consider once again It’s a Wonderful Life: the fact that George was mistaken
about the meaningfulness of his life prior to his visit to Pottersville supports an
objectivist theory of the meaning of life. It is not the case that George’s life
suddenly became meaningful when he revised his assessment. No, his life was
meaningful regardless of his subjective feelings of fulfillment. Hence, I do not
see why we should include a subjective condition in the analysis of the
meaning of life. Whether one’s life is meaningful is an objective matter of fact.
It does not hinge on one’s level of fulfillment. Fulfillment is one thing;
meaning is another. We hope to be appropriately fulfilled, as Wolf notes, but
why muddy the waters by blurring two distinct concepts?
Our conversational tendency to interchange the terms “significance” and
“meaning” speaks against the hybrid theory.41 When people voice concerns
40 The harmful effects of his suicide mostly likely would have a negative impact on the
meaningfulness of his life.
41 Metz (2001, 138) also notes that “significance” and “meaning” are often substitutable.
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about the meaningfulness of their life, they might say things such as: “My life
is insignificant.” “I want to do something that matters.” Hybrid theories of
meaningfulness do not allow for a clean substitution. If one substitutes the
fitting fulfillment view of meaning for “insignificant” in “My life is insignifi-
cant,” the meaning changes. When someone worries that their existence is
insignificant, they are not merely worried that they are not fulfilled. That is
secondary. They are worried that their life lacks a certain kind of value. This
is the source of concern, not the mere dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction is a
result of the evaluation. The truth of the evaluation is what matters. Hybrid
theories incorrectly suggest otherwise. However, objectivist theories have no
such problem. In this regard, they are in better accord with this aspect of
common usage. This is not a decisive consideration in favor of objectivist
theories, but it is a virtue. Given the problem facing subjectivist and hybrid
theories, this consideration merely helps shift the burden of proof in favor of
objectivist theories.
The general objectivist theory that I prefer is suggested in the common
concern people have for significance. We want to do good. Indeed.
George’s life is meaningful because he is responsible for lots of good. That’s
what makes a life meaningful. Earlier I gave this theory the label “the good
cause account” (GCA). It holds that one’s life is meaningful to the extent
that it promotes the good.42 There are a variety of difficult details that a
fully fleshed-out theory will have to specify. For instance, the theory will
have to say whether the prevention of the bad counts in favor of meaning-
fulness. In addition, it will have to specify whether the results that count in
favor of meaningfulness must be intentional, or if accidental and non-
intentional effects are relevant. Most difficult, it must also specify the rela-
tive importance of various kinds of goods that matter, such as achievement,
moral worth, perfectionist value, and aesthetic value.43 This last issue is
largely beyond the scope of this paper. But I will attempt to address the
other questions in what follows. In order to achieve a slightly more satis-
fying level of precision, it will help to first contrast the general good cause
account with another theory, that of Erik Wielenberg.
Wielenberg defends a theory that might be classified under the hybrid
category, though it is objectivist at the core.44 He offers a neo-Aristotelian
theory. It holds that the meaning of life is to be found in intrinsically valuable
42 Audi (2005, 343) sketches a theory with some similarities: “a life is meaningful on the basis
of the good that is realized in it or the good created by it.”
43 This is an instance of the “ranking problem” that faces any pluralist theory of value. Like
Ross, I know of no algorithm.
44 He says that he is offering a theory of “internal meaning.” I will return to his proposed
distinction between “internal” and “external” meaning.
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activities.45 Wielenberg’s theory is objectivist in nature, since it holds that the
value of a life is determined by the objective value of the activities one engages
in. He suggests that we can determine the objective value of activities through
an isolation test: ask whether the activity would be worth engaging in apart
from its consequences. If so, it is intrinsically valuable. Here are some activi-
ties that he thinks pass the test: falling in love, experiencing pleasure, engaging
in intellectually stimulating activity, and being creative.46
There are a variety of concerns that one might have about Wielenberg’s
theory. In particular, there is a significant problem made apparent by
taking a closer look at the items on his list. Consider teaching: perhaps
teaching is an intrinsically valuable activity. Perhaps it would pass the iso-
lation test. Neither is clear to me. What is clear is that the value of teaching
is largely a matter of its effectiveness. And the effectiveness of teaching is
largely a matter of its results: learning. I agree that teaching can contribute
to the meaningfulness of the life of the teacher, but not because it is intrin-
sically valuable, but because it is instrumentally valuable. I see no reason to
think otherwise.
The principal problem with Wielenberg’s theory is in its core formulation.
The theory counts only intrinsically valuable activities towards the meaning-
fulness of one’s life, but this is far too restrictive. Why should we exclude
instrumentally valuable activities that have intrinsically good results? Perhaps
under some strained description George’s activities at the bank were intrin-
sically valuable. But much of what counts towards the meaningfulness of his
life is not in the activities themselves, but in their results. Running a bank may
have some intrinsic achievement value. But it can also be of tremendous
instrumental value. The trip to Pottersville helps us see the good that George
is responsible for. This is what makes his life meaningful, not the intrinsic
value of the activity of bookkeeping. The good cause account of the meaning
of life is superior to Wielenberg’s theory, since it appropriately includes the
goods that make George’s life meaningful. Wielenberg’s theory fails because
it is underinclusive.
In reply, Wielenberg might complain that I haven’t so much as raised an
objection to his theory of the meaning of life as I have offered a theory of
a different type of meaning. He proposes a distinction between two types of
meaning: external meaning and internal meaning.47 As he defines it, exter-
nal meaning is a matter of how much good one brings into the universe. In
45 Wielenberg (2005).
46 Ibid., 34.
47 He includes a third—“supernatural meaning.” I’m not entirely sure that he thinks of
this as different type, since he calls them “interpretations.”
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contrast, for a life to have internal meaning is “for it to be good for the
person who lives it and for it to include an activity that is worthwhile.”48
His theory is a theory of internal meaning. It is somewhat unclear if this
notion includes a subjective condition, but it appears to. This is why I said
earlier that it might be best described as a hybrid theory. Either way,
Wielenberg intends the notion to capture something of importance. He says
that internal meaning is what we want when we want to do something with
our lives. Since he only intends to offer a theory of internal meaning, he
might claim that my objection misses the target. I argue that his theory
cannot account for the goods that contribute to external meaning, but this
is not an objection to his theory, since it is merely a theory of internal
meaning.
Perhaps Wielenberg has captured an important, distinctive kind of
meaning. I am not so sure. I see no clear motivation for distinguishing
between internal and external meaning. Regardless, I do not think that the
notion of internal meaning captures what we want when we want to live a
meaningful life. Like hybrid theories it blurs fulfillment and meaning. Yes, we
want to be fulfilled and we want our fulfillment to be fitting. That is, we want
our lives to be meaningful. I offer a theory of what makes a life meaningful.
The good cause account explains, in part, what makes fulfillment appropri-
ate. It is not the mere engagement in intrinsically valuable activities. Rather,
a life is meaningful in so far as one is responsible for goodness. As a variety of
plausible examples show, one can live a meaningful life by engaging in
activities that are only instrumentally valuable. Hence, the good cause
account is a superior notion of the meaning of life. It tracks what is of
importance. It is in better accord with our everyday talk of meaning. If it is
not a theory of internal meaning, then so much for the notion of internal
meaning.
6. OBJECTIONS
Although the good cause account of the meaning of life is compelling, it is not
entirely intuitive. A clean distinction between fulfillment and meaning helps
account for certain patterns of usage, but the purely objectivist theory is not
entirely non-revisionist. As a result, the GCA appears to have highly implau-
sible implications. In this section I turn to address seven problems for the
GCA. I deal with the most pressing problems first.49
48 Wielenberg (2005, 15).
49 Apart from the first and the last objections, these do not appear in the current literature.
And there is no reply to the first objection in the literature.
550 AARON SMUTS
6.1 Sisyphus and the Vultures
The good cause account is a purely objectivist theory. It holds that there are
no subjective conditions on the meaning of life. But one might worry that
purely objectivist theories have strange results. In defense of the subjective
condition of her hybrid theory, Wolf asks us to imagine a slight variation on
the original Sisyphus myth: imagine that unbeknownst to Sisyphus, his daily
rock rolling scares off angry vultures that would have otherwise decimated a
small village. In this scenario his life has good results.50 The GCA would say
that Wolf’s Sisyphus leads a meaningful life. But clearly he does not. So, the
objection concludes, we should reject the theory.51
If the best, most precise, notion of the GCA includes accidental outcomes
in the calculation of the meaning of life, as I think it should, then the objection
is right that the GCA implies that Sisyphus’s life would be at least somewhat
meaningful. If his rock rolling prevents horrid vultures from spreading a
disease or stealing the young children from a vulnerable town, his rock rolling
is tremendously instrumentally good. Alternatively, if his rock rolling merely
amuses the townsfolk, then, here too, his rock rolling would be somewhat
good. Perhaps, if the amusement was great enough, if the resulting mirth
prevented a rash of suicides, the value of Sisyphus’s toil would likely cross the
threshold of meaningfulness. Yes, the theory has this implication. But I do not
see the problem. Surely the good effects would make his life meaningful in this
regard. Since the good effects are not achieved intentionally, his actions lack
achievement value. But this does not mean there is no value to be found.52
Frankl asks us to imagine an ape that is punctured repeatedly in order to
manufacture a life saving serum.53 The ape cannot hope to understand the
significance of its life. There is nothing we can say to make it understand. But
its life is indeed meaningful. Hundreds of people are saved as a result.
Perhaps, Frankl suggests, much of our suffering is like this. It serves a purpose
in the larger scheme of things, but like the medical ape, there is no way in
which we can be made to understand our role.
I think that there is much wrong with this analogy. For starters, it provides
little comfort. If God were akin to human medical researchers in both his
inability to explain the purpose of our suffering and his inability to achieve a
desired outcome without causing tremendous suffering, then God would be
50 Wolf (2010b, 21, 38).
51 Brogaard and Smith (2005, 444, 447) briefly present a similar example, that of a Forrest
Gump type who accidentally causes lots of good.
52 In a survey article, Metz (2007, 206) briefly questions whether one must love the object of
worth.
53 Frankl (1959, 134).
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so deficient as to be unworthy of worship. But this is beside the point. Perhaps
our suffering does serve a larger purpose, perhaps not. I will put this aside.
What matters is whether we are indeed causally responsible for significant
good. If so, our lives are meaningful. The medical ape shows us this much.
As with the medical ape, if Sisyphus were to learn that his life had this kind
of instrumental value, he could appropriately take some solace in this fact.
Nevertheless, if he were at all normal, it is not clear that he would feel fulfilled
rolling his rock. His activity is too simple, too repetitive, and not sufficiently
intellectually engaging to be fulfilling. Rock rolling is not the kind of thing that
psychologically normal people can find very satisfying. But this does not show
that the good cause account is wrong as a theory of the meaning of life. No,
it merely shows that fulfillment requires a more complex kind of engagement
than rock rolling, whatever the consequences might be. The lesson is just this:
merely knowing that one’s actions have value does not make them satisfying
to perform. Wouldn’t housework be better if it did!
The mere fact that one’s life is meaningful to some extent does not show
that all things considered it is worth living, nor does the fact that a life is high
in happiness, fulfillment, aesthetic value, perfection, or moral worth.54 Surely
these all contribute, but there is no guarantee that any amount of one
dimension of value will be sufficient to make a life one where someone, given
a synoptic preview of the life to come, would chose to be born.55 I suspect that
Wolf’s Sisyphus would refuse. Meaning is important, but it is not all that
matters. It is not the only thing that makes a life worth living.
54 There is next to no literature making the distinction between what makes a life worth-
while and what makes a life meaningful. Young (2003, 5) for instance, sees worth as a matter of
meaning. Trisel (2007) provides the only sustained discussion of the distinction. Apart from this,
Metz (2007, 213) briefly notes the difference, and Metz (2002, 788, n.10) mentions it.
Blumenfeld (2009, 8, n.2) seconds Metz’s suggestion. Haack (2001) proposes that we ditch the
concept of meaning for worth. She does not explain the conceptual difference. Wollheim (1984,
444–8) proposes a distinction between a life worth living and a worthwhile life. I decline
adopting this terminology, since there is better, more familiar conceptual machinery: his
distinction closely tracks that between welfare and meaning. Other commentators, such as Wolf
(2010b), understandably interchange concepts such as “the good life,” (12, 52, and 118) a life
that would seem a benefit (21, 23, and 27), the “fully successful life” (32), the “fully flourishing
life” (12), and the life good for the one who lives it (32). Since she thinks that the notion is
different from self-interest (56, 63, and 116) and happiness (109), it appears that we might have
in mind a similar notion. By “the good life” Hurka (2011) seems to have in mind a life worth
living. He too defends an objective list account. Haybron (2010, 38) refers to “the good life” as
“a choiceworthy life on the whole.” Here I will avoid the vexed term “the good life,” since some,
such as Feldman (2006), use it to refer to a life high in individual welfare, though this usage is
aberrant. Baier (1997, 67–9) makes a few passing remarks on worth. McDermott (1991) and
Harries (1991) putatively discuss worth, and both are cited as making a contribution to the
literature, but neither addresses the topic.
55 Smilansky (1997) objects to the pre-existence test for the worth of a life.
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6.2 The Objection from Vicious Incompetence
One could accept my claim that the accidental good effects of one’s actions
contribute to the meaning of one’s life, but object to a closely related impli-
cation of the GCA. Consider an extremely vicious person who is equally as
incompetent as he is malevolent. He spends most of his time trying to hurt
people and destroy beautiful things. Perhaps he has heard of the GCA and is
intentionally trying to live a meaningless life. But he is horribly inept. Rather
than pain and suffering, his actions inadvertently lead to good, lots of it.
Accordingly, the GCA implies that he leads a very meaningful life. This is
highly counter-intuitive. It gives us good reason to reject the GCA.
Although troublesome, I think that this objection fails. I offer three reasons
for thinking that the GCA survives unscathed. First, the GCA does not imply
that the viciously incompetent person lives a very meaningful life. Although
the person causes a lot of good, his actions are also morally hideously. The
GCA factors in the moral worth of his actions. And the moral worth is
negative. I do not have an algorithm to offer, but the moral disvalue would
plausibly outweigh the value of the resulting good in many cases.
Second, if we consider a scenario where the viciously incompetent person
accidentally saves the lives of a few million people, say by inadvertently aiding
the assassination of a genocidal maniac, then the situation is different.
Regardless of whether the GCA factors in the moral worth of one’s actions,
here we would want to say that the incompetent person accidentally lived a
meaningful life. After all, he helped save the lives of millions! The GCA gives
the right answer in both cases.
Third, consider an inversion of the objection: imagine an incompetent
person who tries to do good but fails. She believes in the curative power of
leaches and devotes her entire life to growing leaches and administering them
to the sick. Unfortunately, she does a tremendous amount of harm. She wants
to live a meaningful life, but fails. The moral worth of her actions is likely
outweighed by the suffering she inflicts on the poor and dying. The GCA can
account for this result. She lives a meaningless life despite her good intentions.
I see no reason to deny that the same kinds of considerations apply to the
incompetent do-gooder as to the evil-doer.
6.3 The Objection from External Meaning
Earlier, I dismissed a worry that we should be principally concerned with what
Wielenberg calls “internal meaning.” But one might argue that I have offered
an implausible theory of “external meaning.” Although there is little value in
the distinction, one might worry that the good cause account is over-inclusive.
It counts far too much as contributing to the meaning of one’s life.
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Perhaps the best way at the objection is once again through a familiar
fictional example—It’s a Wonderful Life. Consider the pivotal episode of the
film, George’s waking nightmare visit to Pottersville. Imagine that instead of
the dystopic Pottersville—the capitalist nightmare where everything is for
sale—the world without George were far better than the actual world.56 His
mother had a different son some years later who struck it rich and used his
fortune to invest in Bedford Falls and its people. George’s wife married a man
a bit less grumpy and far less prone to gloomy spells. She appears to be far
happier in her alternate life. George’s cab driver friend, Ernie was given a
lower interest loan by another bank and uses the extra money to send his child
to college. And so on. . . . Given a glimpse of this alternate universe, what
would George think? There is no mystery: he would surely head for the first
bridge. No responsible angel would allow suicidal George to see this world!
The inverted trip to Pottersville helps put the problem in focus. It shows
that the meaning of life is indeed a factor of the good one is responsible for,
but the good only includes the difference in value between the actual world
and the nearest possible world where you did not exist. This notion closely
tracks Wielenberg’s notion of external meaning: “When a life has external
meaning in this sense, the universe is better than it would have been had the
life not have been lived.”57 He asks us to imagine a life much like the inverted
Pottersville, where had one not existed, the exact same good would have
resulted from someone else’s actions.58 In such a case, he argues, one’s life
lacks external meaning. Since the GCA suggests otherwise, we should reject
it for being wildly over-inclusive.
Although It’s a Wonderful Life seems to suggest a theory of this sort, and
Wielenberg thinks it deserves a separate category of meaning, I am not
convinced that external meaning tracks anything of importance. I do not
think that it deserves a separate category of meaning, and I do not think it
tracks what we want when we want to live a meaningful life. If people
sometimes have this in mind, they are mistaken to be worried about their
counter-factual contribution. The theory of external meaning fails as a theory
of the meaning of life for the same reason that counter-factual theories of
causation fail—they cannot account for cases of causal over-determination.59
56 Some think that Pottersville might just be far more desirable than Bedford Falls. See
Kamiya’s (2001) tongue-in-cheek account.
57 Wielenberg (2005, 15).
58 Wolf (2011) offers a “robust sense of good for” that is roughly equivalent to external
meaning. What we are robustly good for is the good that would not have been had we not been.
59 Counterfactual theories of causation hold that C causes E iff had C not occurred, then E
would not have occurred. Such theories fail when there are redundant causes. Imagine that
there was a backup shooter on the grassy knoll. Had Oswald not shot JFK, the backup would
554 AARON SMUTS
To see why, consider a life of tremendous anti-meaning, such as that of
Hitler.
Hitler’s life has a high degree of negative meaning. It is the opposite of
meaningful. Most plausibly it saps one’s life of positive meaning to be respon-
sible for killing and tormenting millions of people.60 Horrendously evil lives
lack meaning. And Hilter’s life was horrendously evil. Here is the problem:
imagine that one day Hitler did something good: he gave a hot meal to a
hungry homeless child. It might be the case that in the nearest possible world
where Hitler did not exist, someone else rose to power in the Nazi party and
carried out its genocidal mission with equal vigor and effectiveness. In such a
case, the only difference between our world and the world where Hitler did
not exist might be that the homeless child did not receive a hot meal. The
difference in value between the actual world and this alternate universe is
positive—a hot meal for a hungry homeless child. In such a case, the counter-
factual based theory of external meaning implies that Hitler led a meaningful
life. This is absurd. Hitler led a horrendously evil life of no positive meaning.
We should reject the theory of external meaning and the Pottersville refine-
ment for suggesting that it could be otherwise.
However, one might object, if there is nothing to the Pottersville refine-
ment, then why would we expect George to be upset? Why would any angel
worth his wings keep George away from the alternate universe? There is at
least one good reason. One thing that the original trip to Pottersville did well
is set George’s contribution in relief. It made all the good that he was
responsible for clear. However, a trip to the happier world would do the
opposite. It would mask the good he is responsible for and, worse, it might
highlight the bad. This certainly would not help make George see how much
value he was responsible for. It would do nothing but upset him. Of course we
should keep him away.
Further, since George cared for his mother, his wife, and the townsfolk, he
might be tempted to wish himself never born if they would have been better
off without him. However, I see no reason to think that the counterfactual
difference erases George’s actual contribution to the real world.61 His life was
meaningful in the actual world, even though the world would have been
better had he not existed. The example of Hitler makes this clear for negative
meaning. The world might have been worse without him, but this would not
have. The problem is this: if there was a backup and Oswald went through with the assassina-
tion, counter-factual theories incorrectly imply that Oswald did not cause JFK’s death. Since
had he not shot JFK, he would have died anyway.
60 For other horrendous evils, see Adams (2003).
61 Ignore the fact that George is a fictional character. By actual world, I mean the fictional
world of the actual story.
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mean that he lived a meaningful life. I see no reason to think the situation is
any different for positive meaning. We should eschew any concerns about
external meaning.
6.4 The Objection from Endless Repetition
If one could live one’s life over again the exact same way, then one could be
causally responsible for twice as much good. Three times, thrice as much, and
so on. Hence, according to the GCA, reliving one’s life would make it more
meaningful. But it is a hallmark of meaningless activities that they lead
nowhere. This is the driving intuition behind the original Sisyphus myth.
Living one’s life over again is to live a meaningless life. It is as meaningless as
rowing in place. The GCA gets this wrong.
This objection raises a host of difficult problems, but I do not see a clear
objection to the GCA. For starters, it is simply not clear that we should
consider a span of lives as involving the same person. I see no reason to think
that reincarnation is coherent on any plausible theory of personal identity.
But there is no need to rest the case on such a controversial reply.
Second, the good cause account is a theory of the meaning of a life, not a
theory of the meaning of a span of lives. If a span of identical lives should be
considered meaningless, this has no direct implications for the good cause
account. The more pointed question is whether a life is meaningless if
someone else lived a very similar life in the past. Here, I simply do not see why
it would be. If it was good to help the needy thousands of years ago, then it
is good now. If it was good to compose a beautiful song a hundred thousand
years ago, then it would be good to compose the same song now. Not only is
a beautiful song a good thing, the act of composing has achievement value. It
might not be historically unique, but, most plausibly, achievement value is
largely a factor of psychological uniqueness. Of course, these issues are
complicated. For the purposes of a reply, we need not work out a theory of
achievement value. We merely need to note that what was good to do once
is often good to do again.
In reply, one might press the objection slightly differently. If the idea of
living one’s entire life over again raises concerns about personal identity, then
simply consider an immortal with recurrent amnesia. Such an immortal could
conceivably repeat much of what he had already done. He might be causally
responsible for more good, but we certainly do not think that such a life would
be meaningful.62
62 Smuts (2011) addresses the issue. Fischer (1999) suggests that amnesia might be a solution
to the putative problems with immortality.
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The case of the immortal with recurrent amnesia is complicated. First of
all, it is not clear that identity survives radical amnesia. But we can put this
aside. The example also raises hard questions about the value of immor-
tality. However, it does not present a problem for the good cause account.
Much of what such an immortal might do would surely contribute to the
meaning of his or her life. Helping others would still be good post-amnesia.
Why wouldn’t it? However, if such an immortal endlessly composed the
same novel, we might worry that the life would be less valuable as a result.
Most plausibly, it would have less achievement value. We do not need a
theory of achievement value to see that this is the case. This is a core datum
that any plausible theory must respect. Since the good cause account
factors in achievement value, it handles the case of the immortal with
amnesia.
One further point is worth making in defense of the GCA. As noted above,
although Sisyphus and the vultures might live a meaningful life, his life is not
worth living. Meaning is not all that matters. Similarly, an immortal with
recurrent amnesia might not live a life worth living. There seems to be
something very problematic about endlessly repeating oneself. Most plausi-
bly, it makes a life less worth living. I am not sure this is right. But we need not
settle the issue here. What is important for our purposes is that the prospect
of a life of endless repetition does not pose a problem for the good cause
account.
6.5 The Objection from the Results Machine
Nozick asks us to imagine a “results machine, which produces in the world
any result you would produce.”63 Given access to a results machine, one could
bring about much good. Although one would be causally responsible for the
good, it would not contribute to the meaningfulness of one’s life. Since the
GCA suggests otherwise, the objection concludes, we should reject the GCA.
This objection fails for two reasons. First, it is not clear that one would be
causally responsible for the results of the results machine, at least not in any
meaningful sense. We need to learn more about how the machine works. For
instance, how could the results machine produce a novel? Was it scripted by
the creators? If so, it would appear that the creators of the results machine
wrote the novel. By pressing the button one might play a causal role in the
process, much like the presence of oxygen plays in arson. But it’s not clear
that this is the cause we are after when we want to know why our house went
up in flames.
63 Nozick (1974, 44).
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Since the first reply is mired in the complexities of causation, I will not rest
my case there. There is a second problem with the results machine example:
the results cannot redound to our honor, since they lack achievement value.
Achievement is largely a factor of difficulty for the agent. And pressing a
button is not typically very difficult. Since the GCA factors in the achieve-
ment value of a life, it explains the deficiency in meaning.
However, if the results machine could be activated only through great
effort and at risk of significant peril, pressing the button would indeed be an
achievement. For instance, suppose that the button was like that found in the
movie Total Recall (Verhoeven, 1990)—the on switch to an ancient alien
invention that would oxygenate the atmosphere of Mars. Pressing the button
would liberate those in the oxygen-deprived slums from their tyrannical,
corporate overlord. Surely, pressing this button would contribute to the
meaning of one’s life.
6.6 The Lassie Objection
The good cause account holds that a life is meaningful to the extent that it
promotes the good. Since the theory does not make reference to any subjec-
tive states, it lacks the resources to exclude animals. The GCA implies that
Lassie lived a meaningful life. But this is absurd. Animals cannot live mean-
ingful lives. Neither Taylor’s subjective theory nor Wolf’s hybrid view has this
implication. Lassie might be responsible for lots of good. But Lassie could not
be fulfilled, at least not in the way a person can be fulfilled. The GCA gets the
case of Lassie wrong.
As formulated, the good cause account does indeed imply that animals can
live meaningful lives. But I do not see the problem. Why can’t an animal live
a meaningful life? Surely, if there were an actual dog like Lassie, it would live
a meaningful life. Frankl, and presumably millions of his readers, did not balk
at the controversial suggestion that the medical ape lived a somewhat mean-
ingful life. Whether Frankl is right about the ape is far less clear than a similar
claim about Lassie, but the controversy does not stem from the fact that the
ape is not human. I see no reason to be speciesist about meaning.
6.7 The Objection from Nihilism
Earlier, in the discussion of hybrid theories of the meaning of life, I raised an
objection to the objective condition. The objection concerns the very plausi-
bility of objective value. As with hybrid theories, nihilists will have significant
concerns about the good cause account. It has strong meta-ethical commit-
ments to value realism. Indeed, I assume that there is objective value in the
universe. But it is out of scope to defend stark raving realism here. I will
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merely note that I see no compelling reasons to take nihilism seriously.
Nothing more can be said in favor of objective value here. I acknowledge that
the good cause account is off the table for nihilists. So be it.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I defend an objectivist theory of the meaning of life. The theory
holds that one’s life is meaningful to the extent that it is causally responsible
for good. Accordingly, I call it the good cause account (GCA) of the meaning
of life. I argue that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one’s
life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does
it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed.
What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good.
I argue that the GCA is superior to both subjectivist and hybrid theories of
the meaning of life. Subjectivist theories of the meaning of life hold that
meaning is entirely constituted by one’s subjective states. Most commonly,
subjectivist theories hold that meaning is entirely a matter of fulfillment.
Taylor defends such a theory. The central problem with subjectivist theories
is that they incorrectly imply that a life devoted to curing cancer in the
experience machine is more meaningful than a similar, but less satisfying, life
lived in the real world. Since this is not the case, fulfillment is not sufficient for
meaning.
Hybrid theories hold that there are both necessary subjective conditions
and necessary objective conditions for meaningfulness. Wolf offers hybrid
theory called the “fitting fulfillment view.” It holds that meaning arises from
active engagement in projects of worth. I argue that the hybrid theory
incorrectly implies that lives are meaningless unless one is fulfilled, but this is
not the case. One can live a highly meaningful, yet dissatisfied life. Hence,
fulfillment is not necessary for meaning.
The good cause account does not imply that fulfillment is sufficient or even
necessary for meaning. It is an objectivist theory. It holds that one’s life is
meaningful to the extent that it promotes the good. The GCA does not imply
that a fulfilled life in the experience machine is more meaningful than a less
fulfilled life outside the machine. Nor does it imply that a causally good life
high in moral worth and achievement value is meaningless if the person is
dissatisfied. No, the GCA distinguishes between significance and fulfillment.
In this way, it both avoids the problems of its subjectivist and hybrid rivals and
it better tracks normal usage.64
64 I thank Chris Grau for commenting on a previous version of this paper.
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